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A WAD V. ZIRIAX: THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DEFENSE AGAINST
THE POWER OF RELIGIOUS MAJORITY FACTIONS
ABSTRACT

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment creates a wall of
separation between church and state and ensures government neutrality
concerning religious beliefs and practices. The Supreme Court has developed the Lemon and Larson tests to analyze Establishment Clause
violations but has not clearly articulated when either test should be applied. The Tenth Circuit grappled with this problem in Awad v. Ziriax
and, under the heightened Larson standard, struck down an anti-Sharia
law ballot initiative passed in Oklahoma's 2010 election. More importantly, however, the case raises broader questions about the social
movements supporting anti-Sharia law sentiment and how a religious
majority can wield power in a democratic system.
This Comment utilizes James Madison's theory regarding representative government as a safeguard against a majority political faction
in order to explore religious majority efforts to dictate the morals and
behaviors of non-adherents. Madison's cure of a democratic republic
largely fails in the context of the modern majority religious faction due to
increased communication through technology and a shrinking political
sphere. The First Amendment must be understood as protecting the people from religion as much as it protects religious liberties in order to
guard unpopular religious and non-religious minorities from the power of
a religious majority. Consequently, the Larson "strict scrutiny" standard
should be extended to laws designed to establish mainstream religious
values while burdening non-adherents in order to protect against the establishment of a national religion.
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INTRODUCTION

The case of Awad v. Ziriax' emerges from the growing movement
by states to enact legislation aimed at preventing the use or consideration
of Sharia law in U.S. courts. Hearing a challenge to Oklahoma's Save
Our State Amendment, which specifically prohibited state courts from
considering international law or Sharia Law in making judicial decisions,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that such enactments
clearly violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.2 Although
the opinion is well reasoned and thoughtful, that is not why this case
holds great interest. The social movements leading up to and surrounding
the opinion reveal deeper issues within Establishment Clause jurisprudence and shed light on the dynamics of minority oppression and majority power.
Concerns surrounding the potential dangers of majority rule inherent in democratic societies have existed since the founding of this nation
and are addressed by James Madison's musings on the "faction" in The
FederalistPapers.3 Madison theorized that the effects of a majority faction could be controlled through a representative government, providing
checks and balances on any majority vote that is inconsistent with longterm constitutional rights and protections. But many aspects of Madison's cure have failed the Awad case.
Part I of this Comment provides background on how courts interpret
and apply the religious protection conferred by the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history,
and majority opinion in Awad. Part III provides an analysis of why the
State of Oklahoma attempted to institute a clearly unconstitutional
amendment, explains Madison's theory of the democratic republic as a
safeguard against the majority political faction and why the theory large1.
2.
gion ....
3.

670F.3dllll (l0thCir.2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli).
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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ly fails in this case, and offers some alternative solutions to continue the
Tenth Circuit's work in upholding protection for unpopular minorities
against a moral majority. The Comment concludes that the First
Amendment protections provided to unpopular religious minorities must
necessarily be expanded to include any unpopular minority being oppressed by legislation motivated by a moral majority agenda. First
Amendment freedom of religion includes freedom from the majority
religious group attempting to impose its particularized morality through a
secular government.
I. BACKGROUND

This portion of the Comment will provide background on the legal
doctrine used by the Tenth Circuit in determining the Awad case. First, it
will broadly describe the Establishment Clause jurisprudence developed
by the Supreme Court in analyzing government and religion interactions.
Second, it will describe the Lemon test and the Larson test, and explain
the different applications of the tests.
A. The Establishment Clause
As interpreted by federal courts, the Establishment Clause has given
rise to a complex and layered doctrine that applies to a wide range of
government conduct. The original intent of the Founders when enacting
the Establishment Clause was "to erect 'a wall of separation between
Church and State."A broad principle of the Establishment Clause is
complete, official neutrality by the government,6 although some scholars
have argued that complete neutrality is impossible and the Establishment
Clause requires only that the government give no official religious mandate. 7 The Supreme Court has stated that the Establishment Clause primarily protects against governmental "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."8 The Establishment Clause is applicable if the government action involves aid to
religious institutions or entanglement between religion and government. 9

4.
See generally Richard F. Duncan, The "Clearest Command" ofthe Establishment Clause:
Denominational Preferences, Religious Liberty, and Public Scholarships that Classify Religions, 55
S.D. L. REV. 390 passim (2010).
5. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
6.
Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REv. 1317, 1338-39 (1997).
7.
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L.
REv. 146, 148 (1986) ("To insist on strict neutrality in all cases arising under the religion clauses
would be wholly inconsistent with the demands of free exercise and, as the separationists would
emphasize, nonestablishment as well. Protections for religious liberty are no more 'neutral' toward
religion than freedom of the press is 'neutral' toward the press").
8.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9.
Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
845, 850 (1989).
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In Everson v. BoardofEducation,10 the Supreme Court considered a
New Jersey law that provided taxpayer funds to parochial schools to
cover bus fares for children commuting to and from school.' 1 The Court
held that, because the primary nature of parochial schools is to teach
children through a religious lens, any state funding going to parochial
schools is a violation of the Establishment Clause. Government funding
of schools teaching a particular religious view gave the appearance of
government support of a religious institution,12 despite the fact that the
funding was aimed at the secular purpose of providing bus fares." Although New Jersey could not make a special provision just for parochial
schools, the state would not have been precluded from sponsoring bus
fares for all students, public and private.14 In Colorado Christian University v. Weaver,15 the Tenth Circuit considered a Colorado statute that
subsidized higher education costs for in-state students but excluded funds
to universities that were deemed "pervasively sectarian" based on certain
factors. 6 The court held that the law discriminated among higher educational institutions in determining which ones would receive state aid
based upon the level of sectarianism within the institution, thereby violating the Establishment Clause's command of government neutrality
concerning religious sects.' 7
The purpose of preventing entanglement between government and
religion is "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either into the
precincts of the other."18 Elements to consider when determining whether
"excessive entanglement" exists are the character and purpose of the
benefited institution, the nature of the state aid, and the resulting relationship between government and the religious entity.19 One underlying
concern of entanglement is that a law may involve government in religious contexts that are better resolved within the religious institution
itself 20 The Supreme Court considered the excessive entanglement
standard in the context of a government Christmas display with a Christian nativity scene in Lynch v. Donnelly.21 The Court was reluctant to
create a bright-line test for determining entanglement in "this sensitive
area"22 but ultimately found that the nativity scene did not cause government entanglement with religion because there was no government
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id at3.
Id. at 16.
Id at17.
Id.
534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id at 1250.
Id. at 1257-58.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
Id. at615.
Sedler, supra note 6, at 1410-11.
465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
Id. at 679.
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contact with any particular religious entity, a minimal amount was spent
on the display, and it caused very little interaction between any church
and state organizations.23
B. The Lemon and Larson Tests
1. The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 4 the Supreme Court developed a three-part
test for Establishment Clause analysis: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 2 5 The
case combined challenges to similar statutes passed in Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island that provided state aid to nonpublic schools, most of which
were affiliated with the Roman Catholic church. 2 6 The state statutes provided that state support would go towards secular aspects of the school's
needs, specifically the salaries of teachers of secular subjects.27
The main issue in Lemon was whether the statutes created "excessive government entanglement with religion." 28 To determine the level of
entanglement, a court must "examine the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited" by the statute, the nature of the state benefit provided, and the resulting relationship between government and the
benefited institution.2 9 The Court found that the institutions receiving aid
were clearly religious and the aid was directed at teacher salaries.30 The
resulting relationship created excessive entanglement because it is difficult for teachers of even secular subjects to be sufficiently religiously
neutral while working in a religiously affiliated school of their own
faith.3 ' Although purely secular teaching materials like textbooks can be
provided by the state, a teacher of a secular subject within a religious
environment is likely unable to remain religiously neutral 32 ; therefore,

23. Id. at 684.
24. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. at 606, 609-10.
27. Id. at 607, 609.
28. Id. at 613-14 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding
the first two prongs of the test to be satisfied).
29. Id. at 615.
30. Id. at 616, 641.
31.
Id.at618.
32. Id. at 618, 626. The Court explained that a teacher in a parochial school of even a purely
secular subject likely cannot remain religiously neutral because he or she is employed by the religious organization, is subject to direction and discipline by that employer, and works in a system
designed to rear children in a particular faith. Id. at 618. This immersion in the religious organization
obstructs a clear separation of a secular-subject teacher from the established tenants of the religion.
Id. at 618-19.
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government aid for teachers' salaries is a violation of the Establishment
Clause.33
In later cases, the Court began to carve out and refine the Lemon
prongs.34 In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice
O'Connor introduced the endorsement test as an extension of the Lemon
test. This clarification focused on avoiding excessive entanglement of
government and religion that would create the appearance of the government endorsing or disapproving of religion. Justice O'Connor explained that the Lemon test's prongs are about the message communicated to the public by the government action at issue-Does the government
have a "purpose" to endorse or disapprove a religion and does the conveyance of that message have an "effect" on the community? 37 If the
answer is yes to either question, there is excessive entanglement due to
the government endorsement of religion; therefore, the action is invalid.38
Justice O'Connor viewed the avoidance of government endorsement of
religion as the basic principle of the Establishment Clause because endorsement caused non-believers to feel like outsiders in the political
community and indicated that believers were the favored insiders.39 She
later clarified in Wallace v. Jaffree40 that the determination of when a
government action communicates government endorsement of a particular religion is based upon "whether an objective observer, acquainted
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,
would perceive it as a state endorsement. . . .'*' The Lemon test and its

modifications remain pivotal to the analysis of Establishment Clause
cases involving government action that advances or burdens a particular
religious group.42
2. The Larson Test
In Larson v. Valente,43 the Supreme Court held that "[t]he clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another."44 The Court held that statutes that discriminated among religious groups are per se unconstitutional unless they are justified by a compelling governmental interest and
33.
Id. at 618-19.
34. Jeffrey R. Wagener, A Survey of the Supreme Court's Approach to the Establishment
Clause in Light of County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
169, 169 (1990).
35.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 688-89.
37. Id. at 690.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 688.
40. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
41.
Id. at 76.
42.
Stephanie E. Russell, Note, Sorting Through the Establishment Clause Tests, Looking
Past the Lemon, 60 Mo. L. REv. 653, 676 (1995).
43.
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
44.
Id. at 244.

A WAD V. ZIRIAX

2013]

807

"closely fitted to further that interest" under a "strict scrutiny" test.45
Larson concerned the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act, which required charitable organizations to disclose detailed fundraising information.46 The Act contained an exception for religious organizations but
only if the organizations received more than half of their contributions
from members or affiliated groups. 47
The Court found that the statute facially discriminated among religious groups based on their charitable funding sources and therefore
must satisfy the "compelling interest" standard to be upheld. 48 The State
argued that it had a compelling interest in ensuring that its charities were
properly soliciting funds in order to prevent fraud.49 Organizations in
which less than 50% of the funds came from third parties were believed
to be more in control of the funds because the organization's members
acted as safeguards for proper fund uses, whereas organizations with less
than 50% from its own members lack this safeguard and needed public
disclosure of the funds to prevent fraud.50 The Court ruled that the State
failed to show that the statute had a compelling interest because there
was nothing in the record to suggest that a religious organization receiving more than half of its contributions from third parties would need any
more state supervision of funding records through public disclosure than
organizations receiving less than half.5 ' There was no reason to believe
that members supervised their organizations' funds any differently depending on the mix of funding sources.52 Because there was no compelling state interest for the arbitrary standard of 50%, the Court held the
statute was unconstitutional.53
In Larson, the Court took the opportunity to delineate the differences in applicability between the newly prescribed Larson test and the
previously established Lemon test. The Court explained that "the Lemon
v. Kurtzman 'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a uniform
benefit to all religions, and not to provisions ... that discriminate among
religions"5 4 for which the Court developed the Larson standard. However, the Larson Court went on to say that "[a]lthough application of the
Lemon tests is not necessary to the disposition of the case before us,
those tests do reflect the same concerns that warranted the application of
strict scrutiny."5 5 The Court also applied Lemon's prongs despite just
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 231-32.
Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 248.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id
Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
Id.
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having created the heightened Larson standard. The Court's language
distinguishing Lemon's application to "all" religions and Larson's to
"among" religions did not clarify when either standard should be used56
and in many instances, both tests are arguably applicable. Ultimately,
the Larson test created a strict scrutiny standard for government actions
that discriminate among religious groups, whereas the Lemon test is a
lower scrutiny standard reserved for government action that favors a religion over non-religion. 8
II. A WAD V. ZIRIAX
A. Facts
In May 2010, the Oklahoma legislature passed House Joint Resolution 1056, placing a proposed amendment to the state constitution,
known as the Save Our State Amendment, on the 2010 mid-term election
ballot. 59 The Amendment provided that "courts shall not look to the legal
precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not
consider internationallaw or Sharia Law."60 The Amendment defined
international law as "the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as countries,
states, and tribes"61 and defined Sharia law as "Islamic law ... based on
two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching[] of Mohammed." 62
The Save Our State Amendment was placed on the Oklahoma ballot
as State Question 755 (SQ 755).63 The Amendment was approved by a

70% majority of the voters.6

56.
Daniel W. Evans, Note, Another Brick in the Wall: Denominational Preferences and
Strict Scrutiny Under the Establishment Clause, 62 NEB. L. REV. 359, 378 (1983).
57. See Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Strict Scrutiny for Denominational Preferences: Larson in
Retrospect, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 53, 105 (2005) ("Laws that would warrant strict scrutiny under
Larson because they create denominational preferences will frequently lack a primarily secular
purpose under Lemon. More importantly, a denominational preference almost by definition endorses
the religious beliefs of that denomination, rendering the practice invalid under the endorsement
inquiry of the 'effects' prong of Lemon. Other laws creating denominational preferences will also
create an excessive government entanglement with religion under Lemon, such as the law at issue in
Larson itself." (footnotes omitted)).
58. Id. at 86-87.
59. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d I 11, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012).
60. Id. at 1118 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
61.
Id (quoting Okla. State Senate, Issues to Be Referred to Oklahoma Voters for Approval or
Rejection at the 2010 Elections, LEGIS. BRIEF, July 2010, at 5, 5, available at
http://www.oksenate.gov/publications/legislative briefs/legis brief 2010/state questions 2010.pdf)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Okla. State Senate, supra note 61) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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B. ProceduralHistory
Two days after the election, Muneer Awad, a Muslim U.S. citizen
and resident of Oklahoma, sued the Oklahoma State Election Board. 5 He
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the certification of the election
results of SQ 755 and preclude the Oklahoma legislature from amending
the state constitution to prevent state courts from considering international and Sharia law in their determinations.6 6 Awad claimed that the
proposed amendment violated his constitutional rights under the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses for two reasons:
(1) it negatively identified his religion specifically and, (2) it hindered his
practice of Islam by preventing Oklahoma courts from probating his will,
which contained references to Sharia law, and by providing inadequate
relief in the judicial system for Muslims. 67 The district court granted the
preliminary injunction, and the Oklahoma State Election Board appealed
to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.68
C. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit voted unanimously to affirm the decision of the
Oklahoma district court in granting the preliminary injunction. 69 Two
issues were before the court: (1) whether Awad's claim was justiciable,
and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the
preliminary injunction.70 The court of appeals addressed only Awad's
Establishment Clause claim in determining these issues, finding sufficient cause to uphold without having to analyze the Free Exercise Clause
7
can71
claim.
On the issue of whether the claim was justiciable, the court addressed Awad's standing to bring the claim and its ripeness.72 The Oklahoma State Election Board argued that Awad did not have legal standing
because he had not suffered any injury in fact and any condemnation of
his religion was merely his own perception. The court reviewed its
precedent of injury in Establishment Clause cases and found that injury
is not required to be physical or economic but must be a direct consequence of the alleged unconstitutional state action. 74 "[P]ersonal and
unwelcome[d] contact" with the state-sponsored action is sufficient to
establish standing in an Establishment Clause case. 75 The court then deId. at 1118-19.
65.
66.
Id. at 1119.
67.
Id
Id
68.
Id.atll32.
69.
Id at 1119.
70.
Id.
71.
Id at1119-20.
72.
Id. at1120.
73.
74.
Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1122 (quoting Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1113 (10th Cir.
75.
2010)) (internal cuotation marks omitted).
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termined that Awad had established standing because the explicit and
public condemnation of his religion was personal and unwelcomed conduct by the state that inflicted adverse treatment of his religion in state
courts. The Oklahoma State Election Board also argued that Awad's
claim was not ripe for review.7 7 The court held that because Awad challenged the constitutionality of the amendment on its face, the court did
not have to analyze the amendment in the context of a particular factual
scenario.78 In its determination, the court must balance the hardships of
both parties against withholding review. Here, it held that Awad faced
immediate injury without judicial review, whereas the Government did
not face any injury, thereby making the claim ripe for review.7 9
Finding the claim justiciable, the court then applied the "rational basis" test to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in
granting the preliminary injunction.80 To obtain a preliminary injunction,
a plaintiff must show that on balance the following factors weigh in his
favor: (1) likely success on the merits of the claim; (2) if denied the injunction, he will suffer irreparable injury; (3) his injury outweighs any
potential injury to the opposing party; and (4) the injunction is in the
public interest.81 In analyzing the merits of the claim, the court initially
had to determine whether the case should be analyzed under the Lemon
test, which addresses laws pertaining to all religions, or the Larson test,
which addresses laws that discriminate against one particular religion.82
The court found that the Larson test applied in this case because the
amendment specifically delineated Islam as the target.. 8 3
The court then clarified that the burden of proof was on the Government to show that the amendment was not facially unconstitutional,
which is a strict scrutiny level of review under the Larson test.84 Larson
required the Government to show that (1) there is a compelling government interest, and (2) the amendment is closely fitted to that interest.85
The Oklahoma State Election Board argued that "Oklahoma certainly has
a compelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma
courts."8 ' The court did not find that interest compelling and noted that
the state board of elections did not cite a single instance of an Oklahoma
court considering either Sharia law or precepts of other nations or cultures, indicating that the amendment did not serve to solve any existing
76. Id at 1122-23.
77.
Id at 1124.
Id
78.
79. Id.at1125.
80. Id.
81.
Id
82. Id at 1126-27.
83.
Id.at1128.
84. Id. at 1129.
85.
Id.
86. Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 16, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012)
(No. 10-6273), 2011 WL 5518034, at*16.
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problem within the state.87 The Government failed to satisfy the first part
of the Larson test because the alleged harm to the state was "speculative
at best and cannot support a compelling interest."88 Although the state
failed to establish a compelling interest in support of the amendment, the
court went on to say that the amendment is also not closely fitted to the
alleged state interest because a complete ban on even the consideration
of Sharia law in judicial decision making, rather than just a limitation on
applying Sharia law, was not a narrowly tailored solution to the perceived harm.89
The court then addressed the remaining factors used in determining
whether to grant a preliminary injunction. It held that Awad's claim alleging a condemnation of his religion was sufficient to show irreparable
injury if the injunction were denied because suffering a violation of a
constitutional right is very difficult to remedy with monetary compensation after the fact.90 To show that the Government's potential injury from
granting the preliminary injunction outweighed Awad's injury from a
denial, the Oklahoma State Election Board asserted that Oklahoma voters
have a stronger interest in the manifestation of their majority vote.9 1 The
court disagreed, holding that when the majority votes against the explicit
provisions of the U.S. Constitution, its collective will cannot outweigh
individual constitutional rights. 92 Finally, the court held that the injunction was in the public interest because upholding individual constitutional rights is always in the long-term public interest, even over the shortterm public interest to vote and enact the majority view.
III. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Awad was well-reasoned and followed Supreme Court precedent. The decision was supported under the
Larson standard because the Oklahoma amendment was clearly discriminating among religious groups by burdening only Muslims without any
compelling government interest for that burden. The more interesting
questions arising from this case are the current and future social implications of the amendment and the voters who passed it. First, this Comment
will explore why the Oklahoma legislature and voters believed the
amendment was necessary despite its blatant unconstitutionality. Second,
it will discuss the tensions inherent in a democratic system between the
short-term majority vote and the long-term interest in personal freedom
and protected individual rights. Finally, it will review wider trends in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130.
Id.
Id.atil31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1131-32.
Id.at1132.
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A. Why Pass a Blatantly Unconstitutionaland Apparently Unnecessary
Amendment?
Oklahoma's State Question 755 explicitly placed restrictions on
courts considering two areas of law: international law and Sharia law.
This subpart analyzes why the restrictions were unconstitutional and
harmful to Oklahoma's residents and examines the motivation for the
provision. First, the restrictions were in conflict with longstanding doctrines of international and contract law. Preventing courts from considering international law undermined the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution with regard to the federal government's preeminent power to make
and enforce U.S. treaties as law and complicated the interpretation of
international agreements and contracts. Contract law is further undermined by the restriction on courts from considering international or Sharia law by limiting Oklahoma residents' freedom to contract. Second, this
subpart explores why state legislators believed the restrictions were necessary, and how a large percentage of the population was persuaded to
agree.
1. State Question 755 in Conflict with Fundamental U.S. Doctrines:
International and Contract Law
Oklahoma's State Question 755 included a preclusion of any consideration of international law by state courts and defined international
law as "the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes.
It deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals with some of
their relationships with persons." 9 4 International law comes from three
general sources: (1) customary law, (2) international agreements, and
(3) derived principles common to all major legal systems. 9 5 The federal
Constitution explicitly states that all treaties made by the United States
are the supreme law of the land and bind the judges of the states.96 It has
been well settled throughout U.S. legal history that international law is
incorporated into U.S. law. 97 Not only is international law validly a part
of U.S. law, but courts are bound to consider international law when the
question presented concerns an international issue and there is no treaty
or other law on point.98 Additionally, on issues not settled by conven-

94.

Id at 1118 (quoting Okla. State Senate, supra note 61) (internal quotation marks omitted).

95.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: SOURCES OF INT'L LAW

§

102(1)(a)-(c) (1987).
96. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2 ("[A]II Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby . . . .").
97. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), aff'd, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 730 (2004).
98. Id ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice ... as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination." (emphasis added)).
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tional law, the opinions of foreign and international jurists can be given
great consideration in U.S. courts. 99
Oklahoma's proposed amendment seemed to include the "law of nations" in its ban. 00 This ban included treaties (international agreements)
as well as domestic contracts with choice of law clauses because they fall
within "relationships with person" as part of SQ 755's definition of international law.' 0 ' This component of the proposed amendment was per
se unconstitutional in light of various federal holdings and was impractical and harmful to the state and citizens of Oklahoma.' 0 2 An amendment
to ban courts from considering international law in decision making went
directly against the Constitution's mandate that treaties are the supreme
law of the land and Supreme Court precedent that incorporates international law into U.S. law. 0 3 SQ 755 explicitly stated that the provision's
complete ban on considering international law shall apply even to cases
of first impression, which is in direct conflict with the principle acknowledged in PaqueteHabanathat courts should give great weight to international sources on questions of unsettled law in the U.S.'04
SQ 755 was not only outright unconstitutional but also actually
harmful to the residents and judicial system of Oklahoma. The amendment did not allow Oklahoma courts to look to the rulings and decisions
made in other states if they were based upon international or Sharia
law,'o thereby inhibiting the Full Faith and Credit Clause.'0 o SQ 755
would disempower Oklahoma courts to enforce judgments made in other
states if the decision discussed international or Sharia law in any way, o0
causing conflicts for Oklahoma residents seeking to enforce divorce decrees or property rights within their home state if they contain language
references to international or Sharia law. The amendment also created
problems for business transactions and freedom of contract because Oklahoma courts would be unable to (a) adjudicate any foreign choice of
law clause because the statute provided that the courts "shall not look to
Id at 701.
99.
100. Robert E. Michael, The Anti-Shari'a Movement and Oklahoma's Save Our State Amendment-UnconstitutionalDiscriminationor Homeland Security?, 18 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347,
355 (2012).
Id.
101.
102. Id. at 367-68.
Id. at 355, 357.
103.
104. Compare Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012) ("The provisions of this
subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of
first impression." (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010))), with Paquete,
175 U.S. at 700-01 ("[Iln the absence of higher and more authoritative sanctions, the ordinances of
foreign states, the opinions of eminent statesmen, and the writings of distinguished jurists, are regarded as of great consideration on questions not settled by conventional law." (quoting I JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 18 (Legal Classics Library ed., 1986) (1826)) (internal

quotation mark omitted)).
105. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1118.
106. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
107. Michael, supranote 100, at 358.
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the legal precepts of other nations,"' 08 or (b) enforce contracts that refer
to any Sharia principles throughout the agreement. 109 These restrictions
on Oklahomans enforcing contracts and business transactions in court are
the unintended negative consequences of a provision that was seemingly
meant to restrict only religious practice. The restriction of such a fundamental right necessarily leads to a ripple effect that ultimately impairs
other valued protections in U.S. law.
2. State Question 755 in Conflict with Religious Protections
The Tenth Circuit's First Amendment analysis of SQ 755 found that
the proposed Oklahoma amendment presented a clear violation.1 10 The
law singled out a specific religion by name and subsequently gave no
compelling interest to support the action.' The more interesting question is why, despite the clear constitutional violation of the First
Amendment, did the state legislators, and subsequently an overwhelming
majority of voters, continue to pursue this unconstitutional and unnecessary amendment.
Several Oklahoma news sources, explaining the mid-term election
questions and making voting recommendations, gave SQ 755 a "no"
recommendation and described the ballot question in a variety of terms
indicating its obsoleteness: "[a] feel-good measure . . . [that v]oters

should reject . .. as unnecessary,"' 12 "no need for this law,"' 13 and "seeks
to solve a nonexistent problem.""14 If the journalistic consensus, presumably providing an objective analysis of the ballot measures, was that the
proposed amendment was unnecessary to solve for any impending problem concerning Sharia law infiltrating the Oklahoma government, why
did SQ 755 get such wide support in the Oklahoma congress"' and gain
a 70% majority by voters?"' 6 What caused this deviation? The political
messaging surrounding the amendment has something to do with these
results.

108. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1118 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Michael, supra note 100, at 361.
110. See supra Part II.
111.
See supraPart II.C.
112. Editorial, We Support Four of II State Questions on Ballot: Our SQ Choices,
OKLAHOMAN (Okla. City, Okla.), Oct. 17, 2010, at 13A.
113.
Editorial, Our Take on the State Questions, ENIDNEWS.COM (Enid, Okla.) (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://enidnews.com/opinion/x 154637225/Our-take-on-the-state-questions.
114. Editorial, State Questions, TULSAWORLD.COM (Tulsa, Okla.) (Oct. 24, 2010, 5:30 AM),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/article.aspx?subjectid=61 &articleid=20101024_61_0_Eleven67
0211&r=4250.
115.
Marc Ambinder, Oklahoma's Preemptive Strike Against Sharia Law, ATLANTIC (Oct. 25,
2010, 10:10 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/10/oklahomas-preemptivestrike-against-sharia-law/65081/ (noting that the amendment passed the state legislature with an 8210 vote in the house and a 41-2 vote in the senate).
116.
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 111, 1118 (1Oth Cir. 2012).
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The inspiration for the Save Our State Amendment came from various judicial decisions emerging from courts outside of Oklahoma. There
has been a pattern of recent decisions made by European courts that include considerations of Sharia law in divorce decrees." 7 Also concerning
to the proponents of the Amendment was a New Jersey case in which a
trial court judge, referencing Sharia principles advocated by a party in
the case, denied a protection order petition against a man abusing his
wife, finding that he did not have the criminal intent because the husband
believed his religion allowed him to treat his wife however he wished." 8
The case was quickly overturned by the New Jersey court of appeals."9
Following these events, the primary author of SQ 755, Republican State
Representative Rex Duncan, envisioned the Amendment as a "preemptive strike against Sharia law coming to Oklahoma." 20 Representative Duncan asserted that "America was founded on Judeo Christian
Principles," and fighting against the coming of Sharia law (or "the face
of the enemy") to the United States is "a culture war, it's a social war,
it's a war for the survival of our country."' 2' The organization ACT! for
America also supported SQ 755 by spending $60,000 promoting the
Amendment through advertising and robo-calling throughout Oklahoma.2 Even the name "Save Our State" was a signal of the perceived
imminent doom Oklahoma faced from the oncoming threat of Sharia
law.
The wider purpose of language advocating a culture war against
Sharia law, and ultimately Muslim-American citizens, was to create urgency for voters to go to the polls.1 23 Creating a message of fear that a
state or country is in danger of an invasion by an enemy force that is
infiltrating the system of American justice as we know it is effective in
motivating voters to engage in the "fight" to "Save Our State." 24 Who
would vote against saving their state? Motivation through fear of Islam is
a component of a bigger movement that has been developing since the
September 11 terrorist attacks.125 The Republican state legislators in Oklahoma sought to build on this tried-and-true strategy through the ra117. Nicholas Riccardi, Oklahoma May Ban Islamic Law, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2010, at 6.
118. Matt Smith, Arguments to Take Place in Oklahoma over Ban on Islamic Law in Courts,
CNN.coM
(Nov.
22,
2010,
6:21
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/1 1/22/oklahoma.islamic.law/index.html.
119. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 428 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
120. Mark Schlachtenhaufen, Sharia Law, Courts Likely on 2010 Ballot, EDMONDSUN.COM
(June 4, 2010), http://www.edmondsun.com/local/xl996914371/Sharia-law-courts-likely-on-2010ballot (quoting State Representative Rex Duncan, Republican from Sand Springs).
121.
MSNBC Live (MSNBC television broadcast June 11, 2010) (interviewing State Representative Rex Duncan, Republican from Sand Springs).
122. Andrea Elliot, Behindan Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at Al.
123.
Ambinder, supra note 115.
124.
Id
125.
Yaser Ali, Comment, Shariah and Citizenship-HowIslamophobia Is Creatinga SecondClass Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1043-44 (2012) (noting the history of antiIslam sentiment including Attorney General Ashcroft's negative comparisons of Islam and Christianity and President Bush's description of the War on Terror as a "crusade").
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tionale and message behind SQ 755. Because the proposed amendment
was scrutinized by the local press as largely unnecessary to address any
true threat of Sharia law to the state,126 the resulting deviation from this
view by the Oklahoma voters has a "feel-good"l 2 7 aspect that likely
comes from the sentiment of voting for the "American" religion against
any impeding and threatening "un-American" religion. The powerful
emotion of fear of the "other" explains why a substantial portion of
Oklahomans supported an amendment that is both unnecessaryl 2 8 and
transparently unconstitutional, as indicated by the Tenth Circuit's application of the Larson test.129
B. ProtectingAgainst the Power of the Faction: The Tension Between the
Will of the People andIndividual Rights
The Tenth Circuit balanced the interests of each party against the
public interest in determining whether to grant an injunction and found
that "when the law that voters wish to enact is likely unconstitutional,
their interests do not outweigh Mr. Awad's in having his constitutional
rights protected" 3 0 and that "the public has a more profound and longterm interest in upholding an individual's constitutional rights."' 3 1 This
subpart (1) discusses how federal courts have failed to protect religious
minorities against majority moral sentiment in the past, (2) provides
background on James Madison's theory of protecting against the political
faction with a democratic republic and how the theory has failed in the
face of a powerful moral majority faction, and (3) presents some possible
solutions to guard against majority oppression as the Tenth Circuit did in
Awad.
1. Examples of Religious Majority Oppression of the Minority
As discussed above, it is not always clear when the Lemon or Larson test determines the level of scrutiny to be applied to the challenged
government action. 3 2 It is also not clear why discrimination among religions receives the heightened Larson strict scrutiny standard while government actions that promote religion over non-religion receive a lesser
Lemon standard.133 In other words, laws that benefit a particular religious
group while also burdening non-religious minority groups are not viewed
by the court as essential to strike down as are laws that favor and burden
126. See supra notes 112-14.
127. See supra note 112.
128. See Ali, supra note 125, at 1029; supra notes 112-14.
129.
See supra Part II.C for a discussion regarding the Awad court's holding that the Amendment is void of a legitimate, compelling government interest and not narrowly tailored to address the
alleged government interest.
130. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 11l1, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1132 (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 2010),
131.
aff'd, 670 F.3d I'11 (10th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
132. Seeid at 1126-27; Patrick-Justice, supranote 57; Evans, supra note 56, at 361 n.12.
133.
Patrick-Justice, supra note 57, at 81-82.
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different religious denominations.1 34 The following examples of polygamous marriage practices and same-sex marriage illustrate when a law
benefits or promulgates mainstream Christianity while burdening historically "unaccepted" practices based upon a penchant of mainstream morality. Laws that are fundamentally based upon majority Christian beliefs
and designed to burden those outside of that majority should be just as
suspect under the Larson standard as are laws that burden one religion
over another because the Establishment Clause's protection extends to
people's freedom from majority religious influence from the government.
First, courts have allowed the government to violate First Amendment religious rights through the power of the majority in the treatment
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and its historical practice of polygamy. The foundational case against polygamous marriage is
Reynolds v. United States.'35 The Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment did not protect Mormons who believed that they must engage in polygamous marriages to fulfill the tenants of their religious
teachings' 36 because marriage is a civil contract within the scope of government regulation and states can determine the form of marriage as they
wish.' 37 The true motivation behind this ruling is hinted at in the Court's
statement that "[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern
and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and
of African people."' 38 This dictum seems to indicate that it was not contract law nor states' rights on which the Court was opining, but rather on
a belief that Western European religion is "America's religion" and that
foreign or unfamiliar religious practices are not protected by the First
Amendment because they are not in the mainstream. The Supreme Court
reaffirmed this view a few years after Reynolds in Davis v. Beasonl39
when it stated, "Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries."l 40 Denial of religious protections in these
cases was based upon what American society would find morally distasteful rather than upon the First Amendment's protection of religious
practice.
Second, the Court has discussed the role of the morals of the majority faction in cases that concern laws pertaining to sexual orientation. This
discussion is relevant to how the Court views the protection of unpopular
minorities in the context of American mainstream religious values be134. Id.
135. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
Id. at 161 ("[1]t was an accepted doctrine of that church that it was the duty of male mem136.
bers of said church, circumstances permitting, to practise polygamy . . .
137. Id. at 165-66.
138. Id. at 164.
133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890).
139.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
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cause the legal issues surrounding lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) rights and same-sex marriage are often framed in terms of religious values. In Lawrence v. Texas,141 the Court struck down a Texas
anti-sodomy law by overturning Bowers v. Hardwickl4 2 and relying heavily on Justice Stevens's dissenting argument from Bowers that "the fact
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."l 43 Justice Scalia offered a warning in his dissent in
Lawrence that if morality were no longer a compelling government interest, the Court would be bound to strike down a variety of laws pertaining
to polygamy, prostitution, and obscenity, among others. 1 " However, this
warning against invalidating morality as a compelling government interest is amiss because the Court has been moving in the direction of delegitimizing "morality as interest" for the past two decades.145 Although
Lawrence was a positive step in protecting LGBT rights, the Court has
yet to decide further on the constitutionality of state restrictions on samesex marriage.14 6 At best, the Court's protection of unpopular minority
groups by condemning governmental actions based upon a religious
moral majority has been inconsistent, outdated, and incomplete.
2. Madison's Cure of the Democratic Republic and Its Failings
In The Federalist No. 10, James Madison defined a faction as "a
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." 4 7 Madison recognized the common fear of majority power as a threat to private rights to
which he offered two solutions: (1) remove the root cause of a faction or
(2) control the power of the faction.14 8 The first solution, he argued, is
more undesirable than is the majority ruling faction itself.149 Dismantling
the faction completely would require eliminating the liberty of the democratic system (so as not to allow the majority to gain power through voting) or forcing all citizens to have the same opinion, which is impracticable. 5 o
141.
539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
142. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
143. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See discussion infra Part Ill.B.3.c.
146. See Tom Goldstein, The Proposition 8 Oral Argument, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 26, 2013,
11:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/the-proposition-8-oral-argument/ (arguing that the
Supreme Court, after hearing oral arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry, will likely not decide the
merits of whether California's ban on same-sex marriage is constitutional).
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Bantam Dell Publishing Group ed.,
1982).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id at 51-52.
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Madison proposed that the only way to protect against the power of
the majority faction is to control its effects on decision making that may
be detrimental to the minority or to individuals.'"' He argued that a true
democracy will always suffer at the hands of a powerful faction, but a
democratic republic will better serve to protect the minority from oppression. 152 According to Madison, elected officials have the experience and
wisdom to better determine the long-term public interests of the nation
than does the majority of voters, including for the protection of individual rights and minority groups, because it is within the duty of their position to protect the public good.'53 Additionally, a representative government in the form of a union of states is prophylactic against faction oppression because it is more difficult for factions to develop and organize,
and the influence of any majority group that is successful in rising up in
one state will likely be checked and tempered by the other states of the
union, preventing the faction from spreading.154
James Madison recognized the potential and power of a majority
faction that rises up within a democratic government,' 5 5 even pinpointing
religion as a particular source of faction power. 5 6 His proposed solution
to oppression of minorities by a powerful majority faction was to control
the effects of factions through a representative governmental system that
seeks to (1) represent the people through wise public officials who can
better determine and uphold the public interest, and (2) widen the representative scope so that factions are less able to communicate and organize into powerful forms.157
Madison's theory of a representative government depends upon the
election of representatives "whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations."' This
basic premise proved untrue in the events leading up to Awad, as demonstrated by the vast support that the ballot proposal had in both houses of
the Oklahoma state legislature, passing with an 82-10 vote in the house
and a 41-2 vote in the senate. 59 Those representatives who supported the
ballot proposal failed to recognize and uphold the "long-term interest in
upholding an individual's constitutional rights"' 60 as the Awad court did
Id. at 54.
151.
Id. at 54-55.
152.
Id. at 55.
153.
154. Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 50.
155.
156. See id at 52 ("A zeal for different opinions concerning religion .. . divided mankind into
parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than, to co-operate for their common good.").
157. Id. at 54-55.
158. Id. at 55.
159. See Ambinder, supranote 115.
160. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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and Madison presumed all good public officials would. Madison's second guard against the faction-a representative government that
"[e]xtend[s] the sphere"' 6 1 of the people represented, preventing the development of factions by limiting communication and organization-is
also problematic in a modern world that Madison was unable to imagine.
In an age of Internet communication and mass media, people with similar
interests, be they religious, political, or otherwise, are substantially more
able to connect and organize into larger factions and spread their message to others quickly and effectively.1 6 2 ACT! for America's radio advertisementl 63 is an example of how much wider a message can be
broadcast today to catalyze support than in Madison's far-flung, slowmoving republic. The safeguard of distance between factions to inhibit
organization and communication is no longer a viable precaution against
wide-ranging, powerful majorities.
The failure of Madison's two safeguards will lead to more frequent
occurrences of majority factions wielding greater power. Religious factions, in particular, have distinguishing features that make them even less
likely to be constrained by Madison's defenses.'1 Religious factions are
arguably less subject to be persuaded to change their position and more
resistant to compromise because they base many of their positions on
pre-established religious teachings and principles rather than on personal
opinion.' 65 They are also more organized within a community of common believers, while often being more isolated from people who are nonbelievers.' 6 6 Madison assures us that even if a majority faction gains
governmental control in a particular state, the wide scope of a democratic
republic will keep the majority faction from spreading and influencing
other states in the Union.' 67 This theory is only partially accurate. As of
September 2012, anti-Sharia law bills have been introduced in twenty
states, 168 and House Bill 825 was proposed in the U.S. House of Representatives to ban courts from considering any legal codes outside of

codes developed in U.S. courtrooms.169 It appears that the wide scope of
Madison's representative government has not prevented the spread of
anti-Sharia movements engineered by a majority faction. However,
161.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 147, at 57.
162. See Peter Dahigren, The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation, 22 POL. COMM. 147, 154-55 (2005).
163. See Elliot, supra note 122.
164.
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional
Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347, 372 (1995).
165. Id at 372-73.
166. Id.
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 147, at 57-58.
168.
Moni Basu, Rising Anti-Islamic Sentiment in America Troubles Muslims, CNN.com
(Sept. 5, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://religion.blogs.enn.com/2012/09/05/rising-anti-islamic-sentiment-inamerica-troubles-muslims/.
169.
Robert P. Jones, The State ofAnti-Sharia Bills, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2012, 3:55 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/figuring-faith/post/the-state-of-anti-shariabills/2012/02/29/glQAql5miR blog.html.
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House Bill 825 did receive public criticism from various religious
groups, causing it to be sent back to committee for now,' 70 and suggesting that expanding the reach of this type of legislation to a national level,
and therefore a more diverse population, might temper the movement.
Although Madison's safeguards have largely failed in the realm of antiSharia legislation, there are other solutions to minimize the effects of a
majority faction.
3. Alternative Solutions
In his survey of anti-Sharia initiatives from the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks through the 2010 Oklahoma ballot initiative, Yaser Ali
proposes some solutions to stem the public's fear of Islam and the creation of anti-Islam legislation.17 ' First, he proposes public education about
actual Sharia law to deflate the threat being purported by supporters of
the anti-Sharia legislation and eliminate the public's unfounded fear of
Islamic takeover and culture wars. 172 Second, Ali encourages public officials to take a stronger stand against religious intolerance and anti-Sharia
legislation to dispel the generated fear of Islam.173 This harkens back Jo
Madison's argument that enlightened public officials have a "love of
justice"174 and will speak up for the minority. As discussed above, this
theory largely failed in the face of the large support for the anti-Sharia
proposals from the congressional representatives who failed to protect
their vulnerable religious minority constituents.'
As public and political opinions remain in flux, one option to counteract anti-Sharia legislation is for the judiciary to remain vigilant in enforcing the First Amendment's protection of minority religions that may
be currently unpopular. Courts that are presented with a question of religious minority oppression should follow the lead of the Tenth Circuit in
Awad. Judicial enforcement of the Constitution to protect the rights of
vulnerable minorities is well-established.176 In determining whether there
should be any religious exception for Jehovah's Witnesses to a state law
requiring schoolchildren to salute and pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag,
the Supreme Court recognized:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Ali, supra note 125, at 1067.
Id.
Id.

174.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 147, at 55.

..

. [F]undamental rights

175. See Ambinder, supra note 115.
Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?,93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145,
176.
160 (1998).
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may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections. 177
The Tenth Circuit followed this reasoning in its Awad decision, citing
several precedents establishing that a majority vote cannot outweigh the
constitutionally protected rights of individuals.178
The Larson test should continue to be applied to laws that attempt
to single out an unpopular religion and should even be expanded to questions of moral majority oppression, such as laws that discriminate based
upon sexual orientation. The First Amendment's freedom of religion
should be construed to include freedom from religious majority influence
in government actions. The Supreme Court hinted at this in Romer v.
Evans 79 when it decided upon a Colorado state constitutional amendment that repealed all local ordinances creating a protected status for
sexual orientation, holding that "desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."180 Historically, the LGBT community has been "politically unpopular" among those
espousing the religious and moral majority sentiment.'8 1 The next logical
step in protecting minorities singled out for discrimination based upon a
moral agenda is to extend the Larson test to require that all government
actions based upon majority Christian morality have a "compelling governmental interest." 8 2 The reasoning in Romer, therefore, would not allow for government to invoke morality as a basis to discriminate against
unpopular or minority lifestyles, choices, or viewpoints because it would
not be considered a compelling governmental interest by the Court. 8 1
CONCLUSION

The Establishment Clause's protection extends to groups burdened
by government actions that support the religious majority in creating
"American" values. Because the government is precluded from establishing a national religion, courts must apply a strict scrutiny standard to
laws based upon the practices or beliefs of the majority religion that appear to create a burden on non-adherents. The problematic issue is less
the oppression of one religious minority and more the powerful control
of one religious majority that can affect the secular freedom of those who
177.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
178.
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) ("[G]ranted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be
exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution."); Coal. for Econ.
Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[Tjhe court merely reminds the people that
they must govern themselves in accordance with principles of their own choosing.").
179.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
180. Id at 634 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
181.
See supra Part Ili.B.1.
182.
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245-47 (1982).
183. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
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do not hold the same moral values. A moral majority should not be able
to dictate the morals of individuals. So long as religious or secular practices do not harm others 84-- whether by following the tenets of Sharia
law, engaging in polygamy, or maintaining same-sex relationships-the
government should not be able to establish a moral law against such
practices through a majority vote either in Congress or on a ballot. The
Tenth Circuit in Awad was able to clearly articulate why SQ 755 violated
the First Amendment's protection for minority religion, but the judicial
system must continue protecting minority interests against a powerful
religious moral majority at work.

Renee Sheeder

184. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972) ("A way of life that is odd or even
erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.").
*
J.D. Candidate, 2014. 1 greatly appreciate the assistance of Professor Nancy Leong and
the Denver University Law Review Board and editorial staff for their valuable insight and direction. I
give thanks to my friends and family for their boundless love and support, especially my father,
Vince, and mother, Amy. Finally, I am deeply grateful for the support and encouragement of Tyler
Sheyko, without whom this article and law school in general would not be possible.

